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Abstract: This paper discusses how the public setting of
a situated display acts as a resource for security.  The
very publicness creates a social auditability that prevents
certain kinds of abuse.  This is illustrated through our
experience with Hermes – a situated door display that
allows electronic notes to be left.  Potential 'security'
threats have not materialised due, we believe, to the
physical setting of the devices. There are an increasing
number of situated displays "in the wild" and these need
both control but also freedom of access.  The use of
space may be  powerful means to enable this in suitable
circumstances.
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Introduction
Situated displays are now ubiquitous from the red
LED arrow pointing to an available cashier at a Post
Office to the cinema-sized screens found in many city
centres.  While these are merely displays there are few
special security issues beyond those of physical security
of equipment.  However as situated displays become
interactive, issues of security and potential misuse
become more important.  Most research systems are in
'safe' environments such as laboratories or are being
monitored as part of an experiment.  Once these systems
are "in the wild" of streets and open spaces how do we
manage security.  As display surfaces they are available
to all.  Can they be made equally available as interaction
surfaces without requiring pre-authentication or other
complex means that exclude casual use?
The Hermes system
Hermes is a system of office door displays installed
at Lancaster University [1,2].  The Hermes system has
been in use for two years now and we have been able to
gather data on actual usage patterns.  As important,
however, the very act of deployment has enabled a richer
envisionment of further scenarios as well as establishing
a core of users who are able to articulate their feelings
about potential extensions or changes.
The Hermes system allows the door owner to leave
notes for visitors to see.  Notes can either be entered via
a web interface or simply drawn onto the Hermes unit.
Visitors can leave notes for the door owner by sketching
them on the Hermes unit.  The door owner is then
informed by SMS and can view notes through a web
interface or at the unit itself.
The Hermes system has basic authentication
allowing door owners to log in via the web or at the
doorplate itself and leave messages for visitors.   Each
doorplate is also equipped with an iButton socket so
that iButtons can be used as physical authentication.
We have also discussed using Bluetooth phone ids for
authenticating visitors.  However the more interesting
'security' issues arise due to the situatedness of the
displays.
As well as the ability to leave 'permanent' messages
for visitors, the door owner can also leave a 'temporary'
message such as "out for lunch".   This can also be set
by the web like the permanent message.  To ease the use
of this the door owner can leave a temporary message on
the door by simply touching the door display for a few
seconds.  A menu then appears of 'stock' messages and
touching one of these selects the relevant temporary
message.  This menu list can be personalised via the
web interface.  On returning to the office, the door
display (now showing the temporary message) is simply
touched again and the message goes away.
This feature has been used heavily by several door
owners including a department administrator who used
to have a paper list on her door and has now replaced the
paper list entirely with the use of the doorplate.
Hermes unit with note from door owner and
web interface viewing notes left by visitors
Potential for misuse
Note that the setting of a temporary message does
not require authentication; anybody who comes to the
door could in principal change this temporary message.
This feature could easily be misused: someone might
come past the door, notice the permanent message says
"not in today" and then set the temporary message to
say "out for 5 minutes".  Any subsequent visitor
wanting to see the door owner might repeatedly come
back thinking they were simply missing the door owner
by a few minutes.
So why, given it is so easy to subvert, has this not
proved a problem?  It is clearly not just that everybody
who visits the university is scrupulously honest and
above board.  At one stage, a Hermes unit, which was
not secured using security screws, was stolen.  Although
safer than most city centre campuses, we cannot assume
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absolute integrity.  Furthermore, the potential misuse is
more of a prank and would be perhaps a good 'trick' for
a student to play on a lecturer.
The answer seems to be simply one of location.
Although anyone could come up to the door and change
the display, to do so they would be very public.
Anyone attempting to 'muck' around with the displays
like this would be likely to be noticed if anyone came
down the corridor.
Hermes units in the corridor
In security there are two major weapons against
misuse:  on the one hand there is authentication and
protection preventing abusers from accessing resources,
but on the other hand there is audit and traceability so
that abusers can be exposed or caught.   Both can be
used to prevent misuse: the first makes misuse
impossible, the second, by increasing the likelihood of
being 'caught', makes misuse unattractive.  The public
nature of the displays is effectively a form of the latter.
This is rather like a street operating "Neighbourhood
Watch".  Any burglar is aware that twitching curtains
may hide someone ready to ring the police.
This publicness as constraint is important in other
areas.  It would be perfectly possible to use the door
displays to leave abusive anonymous message.
However, this has rarely occurred nd not been serious.
Although this was inituially a concern for door owners
after a period of use it is no longer seen as a significant
problem due again to the exposed state of anyone
leaving such messages.  In fact, where there has been
minor abuse it has been late at night when the corrodors
were empty.
In discussing extensions to Hermes and future
situated display work, these issues recur.  One
possibility is to allow visitors to leave notes that other
visitors can see.  Currently only the door owner gets to
see the visitors' notes. This is rather like someone
leaving a note on another person's door – perhaps saying
it is their birthday!  Options for this include (i) allowing
authenticated physical visitors to leave such messages,
(ii) allowing anonymous physical visitors to do this,
(iii) allowing authenticate users to enter notes on other's
doors via a web interface, (iv) allowing people to
anonymously do this via the web.  Although (ii) sounds
potentially worrying it is far 'safer' than (iv) because
anyone entering a message is clearly visible.
Future plans
Soon we will be deploying a major installation of
situated displays of many sizes and types across
Lancaster University campus.   As well as prosaic uses
such as displaying timetables, we would like more
interactive uses allowing the technology to be
appropriated into the campus environment.  A
distinctive feature of campus life are the concrete pillars
with layer upon layer of posters stuck on top of one
another.  Some form of electronic notice board, or blog-
like discussion set in the central square would be one
way to capture some of this spirit, with information
entered by text from mobile phones or remote web
interfaces.
Abusive use of this is clearly a risk.  Using mobile
phones would mean that in principle there is an audit
path back to the person posting messages.  However
another option is to use a standard keyboard or perhaps a
more innovative input mechanism set in very visible
part of the square.  This would, like the doorplates, use
situatedness to establish social control.
    
Envisionment of a hopscotch-style virtual
keyboard to enter text into a public display
The design of defensive space has been an important
issue in urban architecture.  Security is ensured not by
restricting access but by making activities visible.  If we
want to reduce graffeti in a public place we might use
special anti-graffeti surfaces, or mount frequent security
patrols.  However, instead we may choose to cut back
trees and bushes that hide potential artists.
Physical public displays such as notice boards are
common.  Sometimes these are sealed, but often they
are accessible by all – relying on visibility for security.
In the same way we have seen how 'publicness' can be a
significant element in preventing misuse in electronic
public displays in the wild.
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